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ENFORCING RECOUPMENT PROVISIONS AFTER
GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY V.
KNUDSON: A SUGGESTED METHOD OF ANALYSIS FOR
REVIEWING COURTS
Dennis J. Wiley*
INTRODUCTION
Subrogation' and reimbursement 2 provisions within health care
policies have become commonplace as plan fiduciaries struggle to
contain costs in the face of growing health care expenditures. 3 These
clauses, collectively called recoupment provisions, are written into
health care contracts to allow a plan fiduciary to recover money from
an injured plan participant who obtains damages from a third-party
tortfeasor, through either a settlement or judgment. 4 Any money
* 2006 J.D. candidate, University at Buffalo Law School. I would like to extend
thanks to Professor James Wooten for his guidance and careful, constructive
assistance in this undertaking. I am forever indebted to my wife for her unwavering
support, insight, and encouragement.
Dan B. Dobbs defines subrogation as the substitution of one person for another. It
may be required by contract or acts as a remedy to prevent unjust enrichment. 1 DAN
B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 604-05 (2d ed.
1993).
2 Reimbursement is simply defined as repayment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1290
(7th ed. 1999). Subrogation and reimbursement are terms that are often used
interchangeably in the context of contractual agreements, but that is inaccurate. See
THOMAS H. LAWRENCE & JOHN M. RUSSELL, ERISA SUBROGATION: ENFORCING
RECOUPMENT PROVISIONS IN ERISA-COvERED HEALTH AND DISABILITY PLANS 4
(2000). The distinction is that subrogation is not available to a plan fiduciary after a
plan participant has already recovered funds from the third party. See, e.g.,
Community Health Plans of Ohio v. Mosser, 347 F.3d 619, 623-24 (6th Cir. 2003).
3 LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 2-3 (describing these provisions as
"essential elements of [a Plan's] overall cost-containment efforts"). It is fairly
understandable why plan fiduciaries wish to recoup money to control costs. Health
care expenditures now account for 16% of the gross domestic product of the United
States. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, U.S. Health Care Costs, http://
www.kaiseredu.org/topics-im.asp?imID=1&parentlD=61&id=358 (last visited Feb.
27, 2006). The trend of increasing health care costs is expected to continue for the
foreseeable future unless fundamental changes occur in the way health care in the
United States is financed and made available. See Bradley C. Strunk et al., Trends:
Tracking Health Care Costs: Trends Turn Downward in 2003, HEALTH AFFAIRS
(June 9, 2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.354vl.
4 See LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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recovered by these contractual methods is used to repay the plan for
medical expenses the plan incurred after the participant was injured.5
Today, approximately 160 million Americans under age sixty-
five receive their health care benefits from their employer. 6 Employer-
sponsored health plans commonly contain a recoupment provision for
cost-containment purposes and attempts to enforce these provisions can
be very controversial.7 Imagine being an injured employee who, after
successfully achieving a sense of "justice" in a tort action and the
potential funds to pay a possible lifetime of medical expenses, must
now face his benefit plan reaching into those funds to repay past
medical benefits. Not surprisingly, lawsuits often arise challenging the
enforceability of recoupment provisions.
Yet the enforceability of these provisions, despite their
popularity, has been unclear since 2002. The confusion emanates from
the Supreme Court's holding in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance
Company v. Knudson8 that the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA") 9 precluded enforcement of reimbursement provisions
under section 502(a)(3). 10 Successive circuit and district court
decisions have centered on the majority's definition of restitution and
the distinction it drew between legal restitution and equitable
restitution. The Knudson decision and its reasoning quickly generated a
5 See Lisa N. Bleed, Comment: Enforcing Subrogation Provisions As "Appropriate
Equitable Relief" Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 35 U.S.F.L. REv. 727, 727 (2001).
6 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, HEALTH: UNITED STATES 346 (2004),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ nchs/data/hus/hus04trend.pdf (indicating in a table
that as of 2002, 160.3 million employees in the United States obtained private
insurance through their workplace).
7 The Department of Labor, which regulates employee benefit plans, clearly supports
the use of these provisions as a means for health benefit plans to maintain financial
stability. See generally Brief for Elaine L. Chao, Secretary of the United States
Department of Labor, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee Requesting Affirmance,
Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Plan v. Ferrer, 354 F.3d 348 (5th Cir.
2003).
8 Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209-21
(2002).
9 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2005).
10 ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, divided into six sections, are found in §
502(a), codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). They are the exclusive remedial provisions
for plan fiduciaries, participants, and beneficiaries alike. See ERISA: THE LAW AND
THE CODE 2-95 (Janet Song & Michael Kushner eds., 2002) (discussing the text of
ERISA and these subsections).
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great deal of scholarly criticism for inaccuracies, faulty analysis, and
for seemingly reopening law/equity distinctions."
Whether correct or not, however, what is most noteworthy is the
subsequent inconsistent and confusing application of Knudson by
appellate courts. 12 Circuit splits have emerged as courts grapple with
the meaning of ERISA's remedial provisions in light of Knudson and
other Supreme Court precedent.' 3 This has subsequently undermined
ERISA's goal of uniformity, resulted in forum shopping, and led to an
increase in creative pleading by plaintiffs' attorneys.14  The
unpredictability and the vagueness of court decisions throughout
multiple jurisdictions have many attorneys, plans, participants, and
courts scratching their heads in confusion. 15 This inconsistency has
perhaps been best demonstrated by recent decisions of the Sixth
Circuit. Within one year, the court shifted away from its initial
reasoning of Knudson and now appears to disfavor the use of
" In his much often-cited article, Professor Langbein accused the Supreme Court of
failing to sufficiently recognize ERISA's roots in trust law when determining the
extent and scope of remedies permitted under the federal law. See John H. Langbein,
What ERISA Means By "Equitable ": The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell,
Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1321-22 (2003). See also
Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REv. 1577
(2002); Tracy A. Thomas, Forum: Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1063 (2003). In an unusually poignant opinion, District Court Judge Kravitz
stated that despite "Justice Scalia's cheery assurance ... the Supreme Court's decision
[in Knudson] has created real challenges for those of us who have little training, let
alone experience, in the subtleties of ancient writs." Scholastic Corp. v. Kassem, 389
F. Supp. 2d 402, 403 (D. Conn. 2005).
12 "Nowhere does such confusion seem more prevalent than in opinions discussing the
very issue at the heart of [Knudson] .. " Roger C. Siske et al., What's New in
Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current Cases and Other Developments, SK023
ALI-ABA 1, 269-70 (2004).
S3See id. at 266 (stating that the "myriad of cases" that have emerged post-Knudson
raise as many questions as they answer). See infra note 126 (providing a list of the
circuits and where each stands on this issue).
14 "Better facts (or at least better pleading) were at work in three [subsequent]
reimbursement/subrogation cases where [Knudson] was held to not restrict recovery."
Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon, Great-West Life-The First 100 Days, 10
ERISA LITIG. REP. 1 (2002).
15 See Justice Burke, Decision of Interest: Right of Reimbursement Does Not Attach to
Recovery in Wrongful Death Claim, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 2004, at 19 (stating that prior
to 2002, various federal courts sustained the right of reimbursement by ERISA plans,
but following the Supreme Court decision in Knudson precluding these suits there is
no clear answer whether the suits would be permitted in state court due to the
preemptive reach of ERISA).
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recoupment Fprovisions-a testament to the utter lack of clarity in this
area of law.'
This comment, while acknowledging the criticisms surrounding
the interpretations of ERISA (particularly the civil enforcement
provisions), examines how a reviewing court should analyze an
enforcement action in a contractual recoupment dispute. It will argue
why a reviewing court must fully appreciate the concept of equity and
the principles of restitution in light of the Knudson decision, and how
this understanding will provide a degree of clarity. It is a modest
attempt at identifying the best methodology for analyzing an
enforcement action brought by an ERISA-governed health care plan
under section 502(a)(3) against an injured participant who has
recovered funds from a tortfeasor.
Part I of this comment will discuss the remedies permitted
under ERISA, focusing specifically on the Supreme Court decisions
that have limited the remedies available under section 502(a)(3). Part II
analyzes the Supreme Court's reasoning in Knudson and discusses the
traditional notions of restitution. It will clarify restitution in light of
Knudson, and the resulting implications for enforcing recoupment
provisions. Part III discusses how the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
have interpreted the Knudson decision, and finally, Part IV concludes
that only the three-step test of the Fifth Circuit is the proper application
of the Court's holding in Knudson.
I. ERISA SECTION 502(A)(3): A BRIEF HISTORY
An ambitious statute that required ten years to enact, 17 ERISA was
created by Congress to protect pension and benefit participants and
beneficiaries and established a uniform body of regulation under
federal law controlling employer-sponsored benefit programs. 8 ERISA
16 Cf Community Health Plan of Ohio, 347 F.3d 619 (denied recoupment because
there was no identifiable fund), with QualChoice, Inc., v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638 (6th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1639 (2005) (denied recoupment because the action
is legal and thus precluded by Knudson).
17 See Langbein, supra note 11, at 1321-22.
18 The Supreme Court has resoundly acknowledged that Congress intended ERISA to
abolish the checkered state laws governing pension plans prior to ERISA's enactment
in 1974, and has held that ERISA's remedial provisions are the exclusive. vehicle for
enforcing plans. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52-56 (1987). For
further reading of the goals of ERISA, the interested reader may see Michael S.
Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, The ERISA of 1974: The First
1198 [VOL.9.3:1195
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was the first comprehensive federal statute governing private employee
benefits. 19 It established federal minimum standards that aimed to
"ensure that 'all American working men and women actually receive
the pension benefits that they have earned.'
20
To accomplish this goal, Congress-through ERISA's
expansive preemption clause-swept aside all previous state laws
pertaining to private-sector employee benefit plans, 21 established
standards that set a code of conduct for plans, and provided federal
causes of action and remedies available to participants, beneficiaries,
and fiduciaries.22 There has been a significant amount of litigation over
the last thirty years as plans, employers, insurers, and participants have
attempted to figure out exactly how ERISA works.23 In particular,
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, which limit the remedies
available to plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries in disputes
regarding violations of employee-benefit plans, have been a continuing
24
source of litigation.
One of the most significant sources of confusion has been
section 502(a)(3). This section provides:
Decade, An Informational Paper of the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6-24 (Comm. Print 1984).
'9 See Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1995).
20 Note: The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of
ERISA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1983) (quoting Sen. Bentsen). Professor George Flint
stated that before the codification of ERISA, the obstacles plan participants had to
overcome to receive relief due to fiduciaries' violations were numerous, and resulted
in few actually recovering their benefits. See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA:
Extracontractual Damages Mandated For Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV.
611 (1994). See generally JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004) (providing an in-depth
discussion of the legislative history and societal influences upon the creation of
ERISA against the will of the business community and labor unions).
21 § 514(a) provides that ERISA shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." ERISA's preemption
clause has been interpreted as expansive in scope, and is not limited to only those
situations in which a state cause of action precisely duplicates a cause of action under
ERISA section 502(a). See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207-11
(2004); Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
22 See Flint, supra note 20, at 612-13.
23 See Siske, supra note 12, at 8.
24 Over the last twenty years, the Court has interpreted ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions as providing limited relief and has been criticized as producing decisions
whose meanings are difficult to discern. See generally Langbein, supra note 11.
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(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action
may be brought-
(3) by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary (A) to enjoin
any act or practice which violates any provision of this title
or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan;
25
Specifically, debate has centered upon the scope of section
502(a)(3)-a "catchall" provision-and the meaning of "appropriate
equitable relief." The Supreme Court has largely interpreted ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions as providing exclusive, limited relief.26
These decisions, although generating uncertainty and subsequent
scholarly debate and criticism, form the groundwork upon which
Knudson was decided.27
A. Russell-Mertens-Varity: An Interpretive Roadmap
The foundation for the Supreme Court's interpretation of equitable
relief under ERISA was set in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
28Company v. Russell. Russell did not directly address the interpretive
definition of section 502(a)(3)(B) because the plaintiff did not seek
redress under that section. Justice Stevens, however, wrote in dicta that
since extra-contractual damages (in this case, money) were not
condoned by ERISA or its legislative history, the only remedies
permitted were those incorporated explicitly within the statute.29 The
25 § 502(a)(3), codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3).
26 See infra Part I.A-B.
27 Very recently, Judge Kravitz correctly observed that--due to Supreme Court
precedent regarding ERISA civil enforcement schemes--"no less than six circuits
have provided markedly different answers to the identical question posed by
[Knudson]." Kassem, 389 F. Supp. 2d 402, 403. Justice Ginsburg herself lamented on
the lack of clarity in the majority's decision in Knudson. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at
232. See also Langbein, supra note 11, at 1361; Eccles & Gordon, supra note 14, at 1
(describing a category of court decisions as those who do not understand Knudson).
28 Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). The plaintiff
sought compensatory and punitive damages against her insurance plan for temporarily
interrupting her medical benefits. Id. at 136-37.
29 See id. at 145-49. This has been termed the "deletion myth" by Professor Flint,
whereby Justice Stevens, in noting that the term "legal" had been deleted in the final
version of the ERISA bill adopted by the Conference Committee, contemplated in
1200 [VOL.9.3:1195
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Court reinforced this conclusion by citing its previously stated belief
that ERISA was a "comprehensive and reticulated statute."3 ° The
majority was reluctant to "tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted
with such evident care as the one in ERISA. '' 31 The Court's opinion of
the historical roots of ERISA has been refuted as incorrect and
inconsistent with the legislative history of ERISA's development.
32
Stevens's dictum in Russell subsequently predisposed the Supreme
Court and lower courts to significantly limiting remedies available
under section 502(a)(3). 33
This presupposition against permitting remedies that were not
explicitly stated in the statute took a step further eight years later when
the Supreme Court-in a 5-4 decision in Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates-limited section 502(a)(3) to only those remedies that were
"typically available in equity." 4 In Mertens, a class of former
employees who participated in the Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan sued
the plan's actuary for failing to change the plan's actuarial assumptions,
which resulted in a vast under-funding of the plan and eventual plan
dicta that this gave no support to the assertion that Congress intended legal relief. See
Flint, supra note 20, at 621-22. Rather than an innocuous occurrence, when combined
with the "six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions," this finding gave
strong support that Congress did not intend to authorize extra-contractual damages in
ERISA's remedial provisions. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146.
30 Id. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S.
359, 361 (1980)).
31 Id. at 147.
32 See Flint, supra note 20, at 638. Professor Flint named the Court's conclusion that
ERISA is a well-written and thorough statute as the "specificity myth." Id. Professor
Langbein also noted that the Court is inconsistent in its view of ERISA's
draftsmanship, and has failed to acknowledge that the writers of ERISA likely left
gaps in the law such that courts of law could fill as needed. See Langbein, supra note
11, at 1344-45.
33 See Flint, supra note 20, at 621 (stating that many lower courts have taken the dicta
in Russell verbatim, without independently examining the legislative history of
ERISA). Since Russell, Justice Stevens has subsequently joined the dissent in Mertens
and Knudson, two cases that resulted in a limitation of the remedies available under
section 502(a)(3). See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 263 (1993) (White,
J., dissenting); Knudson, 534 U.S. at 221 (Stevens, J. & Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In
Knudson, Stevens wrote a separate dissent whereby he advocated that the Court
should be guided by "the historic presumption favoring the provision of remedies for
violations of federal rights" when interpreting statutory remedies, rather than
construing and defining an ambiguous term. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 223. This
seemingly indicates that Stevens never intended for his dictum in Russell to be so
pervading.34 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256 (1993).
2006]
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termination. 35 The employees were seeking monetary relief from
Hewitt Associates-an actuarial consulting firm-to recoup all of the
losses the plan sustained as a result of Kaiser's breach of fiduciary
duties. They contended that the relief sought would constitute "other
appropriate equitable relief' within the meaning of 502(a)(3). 36 Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia argued that the employees were merely
seeking compensatory damages-relief traditionally viewed as non-
equitable-and dismissed the suit.
37
Although the Supreme Court had never formally interpreted the
precise meaning of "appropriate equitable relief," the majority in
Mertens asserted that this decision was consistent with previous
determinations of what "equitable relief' constituted.38 Equitable relief
as termed in the statute could mean "whatever relief a court of equity is
empowered to provide in the particular case at issue.",39 This would
have included situations where a court of equity could grant legal
remedies, such as the compensatory damages the employees were
seeking.4 0 However, to permit this broad interpretation of "equitable"
within section 502(a)(3)(B) would render the modifier "equitable"
meaningless. 41 That, the majority argued, would void the distinction
Congress intended between "remedial" and "equitable" relief when it
drafted other sections of ERISA.42 Thus, section 502(a)(3)(B) could
only permit those remedies "that were typically available in equity
(such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory
damages)" (emphasis in original).43
Clearly, Mertens would not the end of the debate on the scope
of "equitable relief," particularly with respect to restitution.
Distinguishing between legal restitution and equitable restitution can
15 See id. at 248.36 /d. at 253-55.
31 See id. at 255.
3 8
/d.
31 Id. at 256.
40 Courts of equity have historically been able to award monetary relief, but it was
largely done in instances of fiduciary violations or abuse under trust law, a
jurisdiction where equity reigns. See generally, POMEROY A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 181, 257 (5th ed. 1941); GEORGE E. PALMER, 1 THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 33-40 (1978).
41 See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257-58.
42 Id. at 258. Professor Langbein pointed out that this is another example of the
"specificity myth" the Court continues to propagate. See Langbein, supra note 11, at
1354.
43 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
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be very difficult for a court to discern 4 because restitution has
traditionally been characterized as both a "legal" and an "equitable"
remedy.45 One scholar remarked that "the distinction between equitable
restitution and legal restitution is a difficult one to determine in
application because it is based primarily upon historical happenstance
and is further complicated by the fact that relief may be categorized as
,,46
equitable for one purpose and legal for another purpose. Prior to
embarking upon that task in Knudson, however, the Court would take a
different interpretive approach to ERISA's framework in a dispute
between a plan fiduciary and plan participants in Varity Corporation v.
Howe. 
47
In Howe, a group of employees and retirees sued Varity
Corporation after a new commercial division they had recently joined
became insolvent, resulting in a loss of health benefits for the plan
participants. 48 The district court found that the company had
deliberately misrepresented information to its employees and retirees,
with full knowledge that the new division would fail and the plan
participants would subsequently lose their benefits, saving the company
49money in the process.
The Supreme Court decided, inter alia, that under "appropriate
equitable relief' the plan participants were permitted to seek individual
relief because section 502(a)(3) was created as a "catchall" provision,
offering relief when other civil enforcement provisions of ERISA were
inadequate. 50 Justice Breyer and the majority concluded that ERISA's
"Justice Scalia, in a footnote in Mertens, agreed with the dissent that the "distinction
between 'equitable' and [legal] relief is artless," but he did not agree that it was
therefore irrelevant. Scalia argued that due to the structure and composition of the
statutory language, "[e]quitable relief must mean something less than all relief."
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258 n.8 (original emphasis).
45 1 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 570, 586.
46 Muir, supra note 19, at 36.
47 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
48 See id. at 492-94.
49 Id. The company induced its employees to voluntarily switch to the new company
division, and unilaterally assigned retirees to the new division. The acts of the parent
company were, from a public policy standpoint, egregious to put it mildly. See Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 5 ERISA LITIGATION REPORTER 11, 11-12 (1996) [hereinafter Varity
Report] (stating that "[s]uccessive levels of federal courts couldn't think of much that
wasn't bad to say about Varity Corporation and its Project Sunshine" and describing
how the Chairman of the Board of Varity Corp. boasted at a party how his company
defrocked their employees and saved a great deal of money).
50 See Varity, 516 U.S. at 512.
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basic purposes, drawn "from the common law of trusts," 51 lent
credence to the argument that plan participants should be provided with
a remedy and that individualized relief was therefore "appropriate."' 52
This analysis-looking at the purpose of the law-is striking.
Earlier court decisions in Russell and Mertens sought to limit section
502(a)(3), and in rejecting the influences of the common law of trusts
the Russell and Mertens majorities had refused to imply a cause of
action that was not explicitly provided within the remedial
provisions. 53 This statutory interpretation utilized by the previous Court
was in stark contrast to Breyer's "loose" analysis, which looked to
statutory purpose rather then "literal readings of statutory language. 54
In sum, Varity effectively identified "other appropriate
equitable relief' as a flexible remedy that would be limited by the
presence of other alternative remedies, policy choices made by
Congress when it created ERISA, and the "special nature and purpose
of employee benefit plans." 55 This broader interpretation was short-
lived, however. As Knudson demonstrated, in attempting to define
restitution as "equitable relief," the Court has seemingly shifted away
from the Varity-analysis and retreated towards a more restricted reading
of ERISA's statutory civil remedies.
B. Great- West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson
In 2002, the Supreme Court majority distinguished between legal and
equitable restitution in claims for relief fashioned under section
502(a)(3)(B) in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v.
51 Id. at 496.
52 See id. at 513.
53 See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254-55; Russell 473 U.S. at 146-47. Justice Scalia refers
to this type of statutory analysis as "textualism." See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997) (providing more information on Scalia's beliefs and use of textualism in the
Supreme Court). It has had far-reaching effects on the "micro"-issues at stake (e.g.,
law/equity distinctions) in the ERISA-line of cases. See Henry P. Monaghan, Doing
Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 32, 35-36 (2004).
54 Varity Report, supra note 49, at 14 (describing the majority's opinion in Varity
Corp. "almost polar opposite to Justice Scalia's" previous opinion in Mertens). The
differing styles of interpretation by the majority in the Russell and Mertens line of 5-4
decisions and the 6-3 Varity Corp. decision requires careful consideration when
interpreting their implications in the post-Knudson environment.
" Varity, 516 U.S. at 515.
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Knudson.56 Respondent Janette Knudson received health benefits from
her husband's plan and Great-West following an auto accident. 5' The
plan included a reimbursement clause which gave the benefit plan "first
lien upon any recovery, whether by settlement, judgment or otherwise"
that Knudson would receive if she took action against a tortfeasor.
58
Great-West signed a separate agreement with the benefit plan, and that
agreement assigned to Great-West all of the plan's rights to any claim
under the reimbursement provision.59
Knudson negotiated a settlement with the manufacturer of the
car she was riding in at the time of her accident. Under the terms of the
settlement, funds were set aside to satisfy Great-West's reimbursement
claim. 60 Great-West refused to accept the payment, however, alleging
that the amount was greatly inadequate and instead attempting to
enforce its rights to full reimbursement under section 502(a)(3) of
ERISA. 61 It sought injunctive and declaratory relief from the court and
requested that the Knudsons repay the entire sum of medical benefits
received, a total of $411,157.11.62
Reiterating that ERISA is a comprehensive statutory scheme
and that the Supreme Court is reluctant to make substantive changes to
ERISA's remedial provisions, the majority determined that Great-West
had not stated a claim for relief under section 502(a)(3). 63 Justice
Scalia, who authored the majority's opinion, quickly dismissed Great-
West's request for injunctive relief under section 502(a)(3)(A) because
an injunction to compel the payment of money past due under a
56 See generally Knudson, 534 U.S. 204. This has been a much criticized Court
decision, particularly for its reliance upon the faulty presumptions put forth by the
Mertens-court in defining equity, as well as the failure of the majority to adequately
define restitution. See generally Langbein, supra note 11; Murphy, supra note 11;
Thomas, supra note 11. The criticisms have had little practical value to courts and
litigants, however, as Knudson has seemingly created an enigma for the lower courts.
51 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company
provided what is known as "stop-loss" insurance, which provides coverage for a self-
insured employer above a certain level of risk absorbed by the plan. Id. Great-West
agreed to pay for aggregate medical expenses covered by the Knudson's benefit plan
that were greater than $75,000. Id.; see American Medical Security, Inc. v. Bartlett,
111 F.3d 358, 361-62 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining stop-loss insurance purchased by
ERISA governed plans).
58 Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207.
59 
Id.
60 See id. at 207-208.
61 Id. at 208.
62 Id.
63 See id. at 209.
2006] 1205
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
contract was not typically available in equity. 64 Furthermore, in
response to Great-West's argument that it was seeking restitution, a
form of equitable relief permitted under section 502(a)(3)(B), the Court
held that the insurer's claim was not equitable because it sought to
"impose personal liability on [the] respondents for a contractual
obligation to pay money-relief that was not typically available in
equity.', 65 This effectively foreclosed Great-West's ability to enforce
the contractual reimbursement provisions under section 502(a)(3).
II. RECONCILING KNUDSON WITH RESTITUTION: AN
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In its analysis of Great-West's restitution claim, the Knudson court
recognized that restitution straddles the legal and equitable worlds and
that the distinction is dependent upon "'the basis for [the plaintiff's]
claim and the nature of the underlying remedies sought."66 But after a
review of the classic definitions of legal and equitable restitution
proffered by Dan B. Dobbs, Arthur L. Corbin, and George Palmer,67
the majority concluded that legal restitution required a plaintiff who
was without means to assert title or did not have possession of the
desired property to offer "just grounds" to impose a legal judgment of
personal liability upon a defendant.68 This judgment required the
defendant to pay "some benefit" owed to the plaintiff.69 In contrast, the
court determined that equitable restitution involved an action, normally
in "the form of constructive trust or an equitable lien," where a plaintiff
readily identified or traced money or property in the defendant's
possession. 70 The plaintiff then had to assert that the money or
property, in good conscience, belonged to him.71
The majority's definition of restitution appears misleadingly
simplistic, as restitution has been identified as a broad and substantive
64 See id. at 210-11. This comment does not explore the Supreme Court's
interpretation of injunction in the context of ERISA's remedial provisions.
65 Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210.
66 Id. at 212-13 (quoting J. Posner in Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754,
756 (7th Cir. 1994)).67 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 212-14.
61 See id.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 213-15.
71 See id.
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subject that has been largely unstudied in recent years 72 and
characterized as a "label that courts and legislatures have given to ...
[several] monetary remedies." 73 In the 1930s-due to recognition of
the growing field and sophistication of restitution-the Restatement of
Restitution was developed to provide a more satisfactory description of
this area of law.74 Restitution has long been a source of debate in
previous Court decisions,75 and this debate is not unjustified as
historically distinctions between equitable and legal restitution were
complex. 76 How one defines the field of restitution today continues to
be an area of scholarly debate.
77
To understand the implications of Knudson, it is helpful to
briefly focus on the possessory requirement of Knudson and the
framing of an equitable claim-traditionally a precursor to obtaining
equitable jurisdiction. Restitution will be discussed in light of Knudson,
specifically: (1) the dual nature of restitution; (2) the granting of
monetary relief under the guise of equity; and (3) the consequence of
statutory preclusion upon the availability of judicial remedies, and the
ability of a court to grant an alternative recourse.
72 Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REv.
1277, 1277 (1989).
73 Murphy, supra note 11, at 1577.
74 See Laycock, supra note 72, at 1278; see also Warren A. Seavey & Austin W.
Scott, Restitution, 54 LAW Q. REv. 29, 29 (1938). See generally, RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION (1937).
75 See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558
(1990).
76 See Murphy, supra note 11, at 1598.
77 See id. Restitution's historical roots in both courts of equity and law are a source of
confusion. Id. The dilution of the distinctions between law and equity since the
merger of the courts with the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
another source. Justice Scalia, in an effort to describe the differences between
equitable relief and legal relief (of which restitution is both), wrote that "[a]s
memories of the divided bench, and familiarity with its technical refinements, recede
further into the past, the [traditional] meaning [of equity] becomes, perhaps,
increasingly unlikely...." Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256-57. Professor Laycock explains
that improper use of terminology in modem courts, and lack of familiarity with the
subject of restitution have contributed to its misunderstanding. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK,
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 565 (3d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter LAYCOCK REMEDIES].
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A. Defining Equitable Restitution in Light of Knudson:
The Possessory Requirement and the Framing
of an Equitable Claim
Dan B. Dobbs has referred to restitution as an amorphous topic with ill-
defined borders, 78 but it does have some core ideas. "The moral basis
of restitution"-the idea that the defendant had something which in
good conscience belonged to the plaintiff and thus must be made to
disgorge it-is the central attribute of restitution and surprisingly was
the same in courts of law and courts of equity. 79 Concepts of "unjust
enrichment" and "restoration of what the defendant has gained in a
transaction" are common characteristics of restitution.8° In Knudson,
insurer Great-West argued strenuously that the Knudsons were unjustly
enriched by the settlement and restitution offered a means by which it
could recover money that in good conscience belonged to the plan.
8
However, Justice Scalia observed that in its pleadings, Great-
West put forth a claim of entitlement of the proceeds from the
settlement and found it was "contractually entitled to some funds for
benefits Great-West conferred., 8 2 He concluded that since the funds
Great-West sought were not in the possession of the Knudsons-and as
such there was no claim to specific, traceable property for the
imposition of a constructive trust-the relief Great-West sought was
not equitable, even though the funds may in good conscience have
belonged to the insurer. 83 The majority emphasized that the possession
of the plaintiffs property by the defendant and the specific
identification of this property distinguished an equitable restitutionary
action from a legal action. Indeed, many circuit courts have adopted
this possessory requirement as the "litmus" test in determining if a
restitutionary claim is equitable.
8 4
78 See DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 222 (1973).
79 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 62.
80 Id. at 550-51; see Laycock, supra note 72, at 1279 ("[b]oth usages are part of any
complete definition of restitution.").
81 See Oral Argument, Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, No. 99-1786,
2001 WL 1182732, at *6-7 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2001) (Mr. Jordan, for the petitioners).
82 Id.
83 Knudson, 534 U.S. at 214-215.
84 See infra note 126 and accompanying text. The constructive trust, a tool of equity
courts, requires possession of the specific property the trust seeks to recover.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, RESTITUTION § 160 (1937). Dissenting Justice Ginsburg
responded by stating that if the determinative factor was possession, then whether
relief was equitable would depend entirely on the designation of the defendant, a
seemingly untenable rule. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 225-26 (Justice Ginsberg stated
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Justice Scalia carefully implied in his opinion that even at the
start of the legal dispute over the funds, Great-West was not seeking an
equitable remedy. 5  This is an important observation because
traditionally a plaintiff seeking equitable jurisdiction had to "frame" the
complaint as one sounding in equity and prove there was no adequate
remedy at law.86 It is arguable that differences between law and equity
did in fact rest on how the claim was framed, 87 and the Knudson-
majority felt that strict adherence to the framing of the claim was
necessary for Great-West to prevail. The failure of Great-West to
identify the property in the Knudsons' possession doomed its claim
from the start.
This strict adherence to principles of equity emphasizes that a
court must look beyond the specific relief requested and alternatively
base its decision upon the nature of the underlying relief sought. 88 In
she "resist[s] this 'rule unjustified in reason, which produces different results for
breaches of duty in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy."').
85 First, Justice Scalia stated that whether equitable relief was sought is dependent
upon the basis of the claim and the nature of the relief requested. See Knudson, 534
U.S. at 213 (citing Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d at 756). Later, he stated that
since the basis of Great-West's complaint was the recovery of some funds and not
particular funds that in good conscience belong to Great-West, the kind of restitution
Great-West sought was legal. See id. at 214.
86 Generally, a plaintiff has to come within the jurisdiction of equity courts to receive
equitable jurisprudence. There were many principles of equity that would determine
by-and-large when equitable jurisdiction was available. Among them included the
maxims that equity followed the law (legal principles will not be disregarded when
they are available), and in a case where there was concurrent jurisdiction of law and
equity, the plaintiff needed to plead the relief sought as one of equity and argue that
there was no adequate remedy at law. See ALBERT H. PUTNEY, 7 POPULAR LAW
LIBRARY: EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, TRUSTS, & EQUITY PLEADING 11-30 (1908).
Restitution was often granted in equity when alternative relief was held to be
inadequate. See PALMER, supra note 40, at 33-34.
87 Judge Posner spoke to this soon after Mertens was decided. See Reich v.
Continental Casualty Company, 33 F.3d at 756 (stating "[w]hether [restitution] is
equitable depends merely on whether it is being sought in an equity suit"). In
Continental Casualty Co., however, a breach of contract claim was absent. Three
years later, Judge Posner thoroughly explained that the framing of the relief sought as
one sounding in equity or law is dispositive of the question of whether the restitution
sought is equitable in the context of ERISA. See Health Cost Controls of Illinois, Inc.
v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1999). In Health Cost, Judge Posner
stated that although a breach of contract claim was present, the claim was not on the
money but instead sought a constructive trust in the defendant's claim to the money.
Id. This view of equitable restitution claim for monetary relief appears to accord with
Justice Scalia's opinion in Knudson.
88 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 225-26.
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Knudson, the majority felt strongly that Great-West sought to impose in
personam liability against the Knudsons, which is antithetical to the in
rem right of imposition of a constructive trust over a fund. Great-West
simply did not frame the claim correctly under the majority's definition
of restitution and was found to have not sought an equitable remedy. 89
Therefore, if Great-West's claim were denied because it sought
non-equitable relief, the contrapositive notion would be that if Great-
West sought equitable relief then its claim would not have been denied.
This would support the possibility of achieving equitable restitution in
the presence of a breach of contract-an action that is predominantly
held as legal (thereby prohibiting any equitable claims)-provided the
claim sounds in equity and identifies the specific property in the
defendant's possession. To more fully understand this concept, it is
helpful to further explore the restitutionary principles as they apply to
actions involving contractual recoupment obligations.
B. Distinguishing Between Law and Equity: Theories of
Recovery
The majority's decision to base its holding largely upon the presence of
identifiable funds, implies that Great-West would have had an
enforceable claim under section 502(a)(3)--if it had only framed its
claim appropriately. Viewed in this light, the Knudson majority appears
to support the notion of equitable restitution as a parallel substantive
basis of liability in a breach of contract claim under ERISA.
In general, remedies may be classified as either equitable or
legal, 90 and traditionally both courts of law and equity could provide
restitution. 91 Restitution served to fill in the gaps where lack of formal
title was an obstacle to justice. 92 As restitution evolved, it became
possible for a claimant to have two parallel theories for seeking
89 Apparently, Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company got the message, and
was able to successfully argue for the imposition of a constructive trust in Great-West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Brown, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (D. Ga. 2002). See Eccles &
Gordon, supra note 14, at 2.
90 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 11. Dobbs states that remedies may also be classified
according to the nature and purpose of the relief awarded, but the importance of
classifying remedies has largely abated due to the unified treatment of all remedies in
courts today. Id. at 148.
91 See id. at 62. Professor Laycock explains that restitution was invented by early
court systems "to avoid unjust results in specific cases." Laycock, supra note 72, at
1278.
92 See DOBBS, supra note 78, at 240.
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recovery of such a claim (for example, a plaintiff might have a breach
of contract claim and a simultaneous claim for restitution). 93
It is important to note that-conceptually-restitution has been
described as a substantive theory of liability based on unjust
enrichment of the defendant or as a remedy that forces a defendant to
disgorge his gain in response to the finding of liability. 94 Thus,
depending upon the claim, restitution has two meanings: it may be a
form of liability or the remedy provided upon a finding of liability. One
scholar explains this duality as "simply a feature of [restitution's]
development under the common law writ system in which the claim or
writ designated the specific remedy."
95
The dual nature of "restitution" makes it difficult for a modem
court to discern the pragmatic applications of restitution. 96 Focusing on
those claims which, like Knudson, are based upon allegations of unjust
enrichment, restitution may successfully be used as a substantive basis
for liability.97 Hence, a plaintiff who proves that the defendant was
unjustly enriched would be entitled to the defendant's gain. 98
93 See Murphy supra note 11, at 1582. Professor Murphy states that using restitution
as a basis of liability parallel to contract or tort has been called "freestanding
restitution."
94 See id. at 1582-83. In an insightful article, Professor Murphy describes the differing
restitutionary theories of Professors Andrew Kull, Peter Birks, and Douglas Laycock
and the difficulties the Supreme Court has had in defining monetary remedies as
restitution. Id. To lessen confusion, she recommended that monetary restitution be
defined more precisely in the new Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment. Id. at 1638-39.
95 See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1066. Professor Laycock offers a more inclusive
definition of restitution by agreeing that while restitution is a source of liability as
well as a measure of the defendant's liability, it is also a "restoration remedy." The
Restatement of Restitution terms this third facet of restitution as "specific restitution,"
and it is defined by Laycock as a remedy that either "restore[s] to the plaintiff the
specific thing he lost" or "undo[es] disrupted transactions and restore[s] both parties
to their original positions in kind." Laycock, supra note 72, at 1280-81.
96 Professor Laycock described how restitution can appear to be substantively similar
to other remedies and thus be indistinguishable. Restitution, like injunctions and
specific performance, also "grant[s] specific relief and [each of these remedies are]
premised on the inadequacy of substitutionary remedies such as damages." Id. at
1283. Thus, it can be difficult for a court to understand the purpose of restitution.
Laycock states that restitution should be viewed as a restorative remedy, whereas
injunction and specific performance are more preventative remedies. Id.
97 Professor Laycock argued that restitution can be an effective basis for a claim. See
id. at 1293.
98 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 566 ("[r]estitution is measured by the defendant's
'benefits' in the relevant transactions"); Murphy, supra note 11, at 1589; Laycock,
12112006]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
In Knudson, however, the issue was not solely whether Great-
West could seek restitution in the presence of a breach of contract
claim, but also whether Great-West could seek equitable restitution and
recover money. Historically, plaintiffs who were seeking restitution in
the form of monetary relief had to assert their claims at law and seek
"legal restitution." 99 Thus, a claim of equitable restitution becomes
much more complicated when, as in Knudson, the defendant's gain is
monetaryl00 and there are other legitimate theories of recovery
available to the plaintiff.' 0' The plaintiff can recover in an action at
law, negating the need for equitable restitution.
Yet courts of equity would often entertain monetary claims by
acting on the in personam power coupled with a flexible standard of
supra note 72, at 1283-85. See Muir, supra note 19, at 33 (discussing the necessary
elements to prove an unjust enrichment claim).
99 Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213 (quoting 1 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 587-88). In the
absence of a contract but with the presence of a promise, courts of law would impose
the quasi-contract to prevent unjust enrichment. See DOBBS, supra note 78, at 234-35.
100 Money, in the form of profits, was sometimes awarded in equity when a defendant
profited from ill-gotten proceeds taken from the plaintiff. See Murphy, supra note 11,
at 1600, n. 116. But if profit gains of the defendant were absent and the legal relief
adequate, generally when the relief sought was money in the presence of a breach of
contract claim a court of law would most often provide legal relief in the form of
damages. Id. at 1603-04. Judge Posner, in a case decided soon after Knudson, stated
in dictum that a plaintiff could sue in equity under section 502(a)(3) to recover
interest a plan fiduciary gains by wrongfully withholding benefits, "because it is the
amount by which the plan has unjustly enriched itself, and unjust enrichment is a
basis, indeed the usual basis, for imposing a constructive trust on a sum of money."
May Dept. Stores Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 597, 603 (7th Cir. 2002).
101 A plaintiff may have underlying tort or contract claims against a defendant, in
addition to a claim of unjust enrichment. Professor Laycock describes an example
where a person steals a hundred dollar bill: the tort of conversion also makes the
defendant unjustly enriched by one hundred dollars. See Laycock, supra note 72, at
1283. This duality of claims complicates the issue because monetary judgments are
largely the domain of courts of law, not equity. Id. at 1283; see Murphy, supra note
11, at 1589. Rather than discern the specific applications of unjust enrichment,
Professor Laycock offers limited situations in which restitutionary claims are
available:
The restitutionary claim matters in three sets of cases: (1) when
unjust enrichment is the only source of liability; (2) when plaintiff
prefers to measure recovery by defendant's gain, either because it
exceeds plaintiffs loss or because it is easier to measure; and (3)
when plaintiff prefers specific restitution, either because defendant
is insolvent, because the thing plaintiff lost has changed in value, or
because plaintiff values the thing he lost for nonmarket reasons.
Laycock, supra note 72, at 1284.
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what a court would consider "good conscience."' 0 2 Courts of law
utilized the common law writ of assumpsit that required a plaintiff to
convince a court that the defendant's gain was rightfully the plaintiffs
property. 103 Both systems justified the remedy by unjust enrichment,
measured by the defendant's benefit and combined with the lack of
formal title. 0 4 Alas, in a situation such as this, whether the relief
sought is money appears not to offer a conclusive answer to the "legal
or equitable restitution" question. Justice Scalia acknowledged this
truism in Knudson as he argued that the dissent's assertion of looking
to the "substance" of the relief requested to determine if the claim is
equitable was not as determinative as the dissent would have it.' 
05
Rather, Justice Scalia asserted that the definitive interpretation
of restitution is based on the "legal theory under which it is
awarded."10 6 For example, a plaintiff (as in Knudson) may have a claim
of liability grounded in breach of contract and may also have a parallel
claim of unjust enrichment. Generally, a recovery in equity is not
permitted if the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, such as in a
breach of contract claim.10 7 A court will arrive at this conclusion by
noting that it is the breach of contract that makes the defendant's
enrichment unjust-he broke the contract and is keeping the gains. 10 8
The breach of contract, as the basis of the action, offers a legal remedy
and equitable restitution would not be awarded. However, the analysis
changes somewhat if there is no adequate remedy at law-i.e., the legal
102 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 587.
103 See generally id. at 578, 581-83.
104 Cf 1 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 587 (describing the equity courts' ability to ignore
legal title) with 1 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 579 (describing development of assumpsit
and quasi-contract where there was no contract between the parties). See Muir, supra
note 19, at 36 (stating that the distinction between legal and equitable is based on
"historical happenstance" and is a difficult one to make).
105 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 216.
106 Id. Professor Murphy also supports this distinction when attempting to characterize
the monetary remedy as one for damages, as in a contract claim, or restitution. Even if
there are more than one legitimate theory of recovery, the grounds for liability
remains the distinguishing factor. See Murphy, supra note 11, at 1589.
107 Professor Laycock defines the adequacy rule as "[a] legal remedy is adequate only
if it is complete, practical, and efficient as the equitable remedy." DOUGLAS LAYCOCK
THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 22 (1991).
108 See Laycock, supra note 72, at 1286. This relegates the substantive unjust
enrichment liability claim to secondary status, and restitution is transformed to
remedial form whereby the defendant's enrichment is recognized as an alternate
measure of recovery for the underlying wrong. Id.
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remedies are precluded by statute. The statutory preclusion shifts a
court to permitting an equitable remedy.
This is exactly the scenario Knudson provided: the plan
participant broke a contractual agreement requiring the participant to
give money acquired from third-party tortfeasors to the plan, and was
unjustly enriched as a result. 10 9 As stated above, plaintiffs asserting
restitutionary claims for money historically still had to assert the claim
at law, even if a plaintiff is able to identify a particular fund in
possession of the defendant as his."10 In some instances, however, a
court may provide equitable relief-including monetary-if there was
no adequate remedy at law and the relief sought was equitable in
nature. Arguably, this is what the Supreme Court alluded to in
Knudson.
The likelihood of the majority in Knudson providing for the
availability of an alternative remedy when a plaintiff has no adequate
remedy at law, particularly if the absence of a remedy is due to a
statutory preclusion such as ERISA, historically has support."'
Generally, courts may view a statute as taking away a right and thereby
denying relief, or may view a law as prohibiting one avenue of relief
but granting another means for relief. 12 Clearly, section 502(a)(3) of
ERISA has been interpreted as granting only "equitable relief." Legal
relief (i.e., money damages) is not permitted for claims brought under
this section. The Knudson majority appears to hold that since Great-
West failed to follow the correct procedure for the imposition of a
constructive trust-an equitable remedy-by not identifying specific
funds under the Knudsons' control in its claim, the Supreme Court was
not in a position to issue an in personam order requiring the Knudsons
109 See generally Knudson, 534 U.S. 204.
10 See Murphy, supra note 11, at 1603. See also LAYCOCK REMEDIES, supra note 77,
at 569.
111 As stated previously, traditionally to obtain relief from a court of equity, a plaintiff
first must prove that the relief sought is framed as equitable, and there is no adequate
remedy at law. See PUTNEY, supra note 86. Professor Murphy, citing Andrew Kull as
supporting authority, argued that in Knudson the unjust enrichment claim "seems
secondary, for the contract theory more conventionally describes the basis of
liability." Murphy, supra note 11, at 1618.
112 This doctrine was espoused in an 1814 decision in Massachusetts, whereby "Mill
Acts," laws designed to promote the creation of mill commerce, precluded common
law suits for damages against mill property owners whose actions occasionally
flooded adjoining properties. "If it should be said that the legislature itself has not the
constitutional authority to deprive a citizen of a remedy for a wrong ... the answer is
obvious, that [rather the legislature has] a right to substitute one [remedy] for another
... " Stowell v. Flagg, 11 MASS. REP. 364, 365 (1814).
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to transfer legal rights to the funds to Great-West. 113 To do so would
create a legal remedy,1 14 thereby contravening section 502(a)(3) and
previous Court decisions limiting the relief available under this section.
Furthermore, the Court appears to hold that the equitable relief sought
must strictly conform to the restitutionary tools historically known as
constructive trust or equitable lien. The Court does not appear to be
unilaterally denying all forms of monetary relief to claimants who sue
for equitable remedial action under section 502(a)(3), but rather
emphasized that equitable relief will be granted if it appears to the
Court that it is indeed truly equitable.
C. In Summary: The Melding of Knudson and Restitution
Thus, at its most basic level, Knudson appears to say that without the
existence of an identifiable, traceable fund, a plan fiduciary cannot seek
equitable relief in the presence of a breach of contract claim against a
participant who recovers money from a third party tortfeasor. Arguably
the most significant lessons are not what Knudson explicitly stated, but
what we have discussed above. First, a plan fiduciary may likely
enforce recoupment provisions, even in the presence of breach of
contract, provided the claim sounds in equity and does not seek to
impose in personam liability. Second, the Court perhaps has let its
intentions be known that if a plan fiduciary seeks restitution as a
parallel basis of liability, rather than suing on the basic contract claim,
it will impose stringent requirements on the plaintiff to ensure that it is
not in fact trying to impose personal liability.
Finally, it is important to note that the majority was explicit in
limiting the reach of this decision. Specifically, it announced that it was
only ruling on the particular issue at hand, and refused to discuss
alternative remedies that might have been available to Great-West, such
as state contract actions or direct actions. The Court also did not say if
Great-West would have had a successful equitable restitution claim
113 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 590-91 ("[T]he constructive trust plaintiff who
proves his claim ... wins an in personam order that requires the defendant to transfer
legal rights and title of specific property or intangibles to the plaintiff."); see also
Reynolds v. South Central Regional Laborers, 306 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652 (W.D. La.
2004) (interpreting the implication of Knudson to the instant case).
114 Without the presence of property, the remedy would impose personal liability upon
a defendant to pay a sum of money. The remedy for a quasi-contractual obligation - a
legal action.
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against the Special Needs Trust.' 15 Rather, it stated that there may have
been other forms of legal relief available to Great-West and reserved
any opinions regarding other remedies aside from restitution and
injunction. 116
The Court's reluctance to expand the remedial provisions in
Knudson is in line with the Court's previous rulings in Russell and
Mertens, which limited the remedies available under section 502(a)(3),
although it is inapposite to the Court's willingness in Varity to follow a
much "looser" interpretation of the ERISA remedial provisions. The
presence of this interpretative dichotomy is reinforced in the seemingly
opposite stances taken by Justices Ginsburg and Scalia as to the nature
of restitution in the context of ERISA. The dissent in Knudson argued
that the requirement of an identified fund implied a rigid-like condition
that served as a distinction between equitable and legal restitution. 117
Equity was a tool by which courts could fill in the gaps left by courts of
law, which utilized formal title as a method of awarding relief.118 In
'15 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 220. There has been some dispute about the scope of
Knudson regarding this question. See Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439
(5th Cir. 2002) (holding that because the present case has facts almost identical to
Great-West, the plaintiff s declaratory judgment claim was not permitted against the
Special Needs Trust as an form of equitable relief). See generally Givens v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. & Assoc. Health & Welfare Plan, 327 F. Supp.2d 1057, 1061 (D. Neb.
2003) (holding that although the funds are not in the control of the defendant, the Plan
could none-the-less impose a constructive trust due to the flexible nature of these
trusts).
116 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 220. However, during oral argument the Court did
acknowledge that the looming presence of preemption by ERISA would likely make
it very difficult for a plan fiduciary to assert a state contract claim. See generally Oral
Argument, Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, No. 99-1786, 2001 WL
1182732, at *30-38 (Mr. Taranto, for the respondents). But see Providence Health
Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a direct action by a
plan fiduciary seeking reimbursement from a plan participant based on breach of
contract was not preempted by ERISA). There have been additional recent Federal
Appellate Court decisions that have evaluated and subsequently interpreted the
Supreme Court's non-answer to the issue of other remedies. For example, in
Cooperative Benefit Administrators, Inc. v. Ogden, the Fourth Circuit held that the
Supreme Court did not endorse the existence of a federal common law remedy when
it stated in Knudson that "there may have been other means for [Great-West] to obtain
the essentially legal relief that they seek." Cooperative Benefit Administrators, Inc. v.
Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. 2004).
117 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 228. Justice Ginsburg noted that the flexibility permitted
under equity was to be used to give effect to legislative policy, and that Justice
Scalia's rationale ran counter to both the traditional nature of equity as well as the
desired effect of ERISA by policy makers at its inception.
118 See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
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keeping with this understanding, restitution is not a system of rigid
rules with determinative bright line tests." 9 Yet, the majority tells us
that in order to have a successful claim for equitable relief under
section 502(a)(3)(B), a plaintiff must assert that it is entitled to
identifiable funds possessed by the defendant that in good conscience
belong to the plaintiff. 120
As argued by the dissent, this is antithetical to the spirit of
Varity, which viewed section 502(a)(3) as a "catchall" provision, and if
read in this broad manner would have likely provided relief to Great-
West in spite of the vagueness of its pleading. 121 Perhaps an
explanation for the distinction lies in the presence of the breach of
contract claim in this case, where the legal relief in contract law would
have historically dominated over the equitable principles of trust law in
the absence of the limitation of remedies by ERISA section 502(a)(3).
Whereas in Varity the absence of a contract in the midst of fiduciary
misrepresentation sounded the bells of trust law and equity more
clearly, the majority in Knudson was only willing to extend relief to a
fiduciary under section 502(a)(3) if it truly framed the relief sought as
equitable-that is-if the fiduciary claimed a right to traceable assets.
Thus, in summary, a reviewing court should recognize that
restitution may provide a basis for liability that is parallel to contract
and tort.122 Possession of the funds is not the sole determinative factor,
but rather a court should first look to ascertain if the remedy sought was
legal or equitable, a distinction that turns on the presence of traceable
funds, 12 3 the framing of an equitable claim, and whether or not there is
an adequate remedy at law. To systematically apply Knudson to similar
scenarios and base the decision largely upon possession is a failure to
appreciate the nuances of restitution, the underlying distinctions
between law and equity, and the self-acknowledged limits of Knudson.
Subsequent to this decision, circuit splits and scholarly criticism
over the exact holding of Knudson have abounded. 124 Much of the
confusion and criticism lies in the Supreme Court's seeming
119 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 228 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
120 See id. at 214.
121 Justice Stevens wrote that he found it "difficult ... to understand why Congress
would not have wanted to provide recourse in federal court for the plan violation
disclosed by the record" in Knudson. Id. at 223.
122 See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
123 See Bauhaus, 292 F.3d at 451 (Wiener, J., dissenting) ("the Court's test hinged not
on who possessed the disputed funds, but rather on what kind of remedy would enable
the plaintiff to recover those funds.").
124 See supra note 11.
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petrification of equitable restitution and the role of monetary relief
within the context of ERISA. For a reviewing court, this has likely been
compounded by the likelihood that, as generally stated previously,
"restitution is a relatively neglected ... part of the law." 125
III. SIGNIFICANT LOWER COURT DECISIONS POST-
KNUDSON: A PATH TO FOLLOW?
The fallout of the majority's holding in Knudson can be seen as the
lower courts have attempted to apply it in cases involving subrogation
and reimbursement clauses where money was obtained by the plan
participants in third party tort actions. Inconsistent holdings in similar
subrogation actions have appeared in lower courts within the same
circuit' 26 and at the appellate level, the circuit courts are divided
roughly into two camps-each espousing a different interpretation of
Knudson. 127 The Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Qualchoice, Inc. v.
12' Laycock, supra note 72, at 1277. Professor Laycock goes on to say that when
confronted with an area of law as complex as restitution, a lawyer's understanding of
the subject likely "consists largely of blank spaces with undefined borders" and
"scattered patches of familiar ground." Id. See also Murphy, supra note 11, at 1581
(quoting Professor Andrew Kull's statements published in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, Reporter's Introductory Memorandum,
xvi (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000)).
126 For example, in the Second Circuit, a district court in New York has held Knudson
precludes monetary relief under § 502(a)(3), but the Connecticut Supreme Court has
held that subrogation should be permitted in ERISA matters. Bona v. Barasch, 2003
WL 1395932 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2003); Gaunlett v. Webb, 2003 WL 22079536
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2003).
127 The Fifth Circuit, in Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v.
Ferrer, has been joined by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits in holding that an
equitable restitution claim may stand if the plan fiduciary can identify specific funds
in the possession and control of the defendant. See, e.g., Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 348;
Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Young, 2003 WL 22973630 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 2003);
Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco,
338 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Circuit has held that only equitable
remedies, such as constructive trust, injunction, and restitution, are available in
recoupment actions. N. Am. Coal Corp. v. Roth, 395 F.3d 916, 917 (8th Cir. 2005).
The Ninth Circuit, recently joined by the Sixth Circuit, holds that a plan
administrator's suit to recover proceeds from an insured's settlement with a third-part
tortfeasor is nothing more than a breach of contract claim, which is a classic action at
law and prohibited by section 502(a)(3). See, e.g., QualChoice, 367 F.3d 638; Westaff
(USA) Inc. v. Arce, 298 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002). The First, Second, Third, Tenth,
Eleventh Circuits have not yet rendered definitive decisions with respect to the
enforceability of recoupment provisions. However, district court decisions in the
First, Third, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits appear to fall in line with the Fifth
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Rowland is an example of the difficulty the courts are having with
Knudson. The following briefly introduces the analyses various
appellate courts have adopted post-Knudson.
A. The Three-step Test of the Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit, in Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare
Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, was presented with a law firm and a participant
of the Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan ("the
Plan") who appealed from a district court's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the Plan.128 Essentially, the Plan was seeking to
enforce its reimbursement provision against a participant who had
negotiated a settlement with the responsible tortfeasor. 129
The question before the court was whether the Plan, although
characterizing the relief sought in its claim as equitable, was actually
seeking to impose personal liability upon the participant by enforcing
the participant's contractual obligations.' 30 On its face, this claim was
similar to the claim at issue in Knudson. However, the Fifth Circuit
distinguished Knudson by noting that while the relief sought was
monetary and the obligation originated in contract, the relief was
granted not from the personal resources of the participant but from a
traceable fund. 131 Citing Knudson, the Fifth Circuit stated that the
relevant inquiry asks whether "the Plan seeks to recover funds (1) that
are specifically identifiable, (2) that belong in good conscience to the
Plan, and (3) that are within the possession and control of the
defendant." 1 32 Since the funds were held in an identifiable account and
the participant's attorney, acting as his agent, was merely holding the
funds for the participant, the Plan was able avoid the issue of
untraceable funds that was detrimental to Great-West's case. 133 The
court determined that upon the basis of the signed reimbursement
Circuit's interpretation of Knudson. See, e.g., Mank v. Green, 323 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.
Me. 2004); Carpenters Pension and Annuity Fund of Philadelphia v. Banks, 271 F.
Supp. 2d 639 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assoc. Health &
Welfare Plan v. Willard, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (D. Kan. 2004); B.P. Amoco Corp. v.
Connell, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (M.D. Ga. 2004).
128 See Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356.
129 See id. at 350-52. The Plan sought to impose a constructive trust over the
settlement funds. Id. at 351.
130 Id. at 355.
131 See id. at 356.
132 Id. at 356.
133 See id.
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agreement between the Plan and the participant, a portion of the funds
recovered from the tortfeasor did in fact belong in good conscience to
the Plan. 1
34
B. The Ninth Circuit: Look To The Substance of The Relief
The Ninth Circuit has employed a broader reading of Knudson and has
held that regardless if traceable funds are present, an action against a
plan participant is not actionable under section 502(a)(3)(B). 13 5 In
Westaff (USA) Inc., v. Arce, the facts were very similar to Bombardier:
an injured plan participant subsequently recovered money from a
tortfeasor and was sued by a fiduciary of her health plan for the amount
of benefits paid. 136 The tort settlement money was held in an escrow
account, and the Plan sought a declaratory judgment and requested
equitable relief in enforcing the reimbursement provision in the
contract. 137
The Ninth Circuit held that in determining whether the relief
requested was legal or equitable, it would look to the "substance of the
remedy sought ... rather than the label placed on that remedy."'' 38
Because the basis of the Plan's claim for monetary relief was the
enforcement of a contractual obligation, the Ninth Circuit asserted that
it would look past the pleadings in determining if the claim was for
equitable or legal relief.139 Since a breach of contract action to recover
money was a classic action at law, the "action remains one for money
damages" and therefore the Plan's relief was legal and not permissible
under section 502(a)(3)(B). '40
C. The "Flip-Flop" of the Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit, until recently, held that the possession of an
identifiable fund-the lynchpin of the test promulgated by the Fifth
Circuit in Bombardier-was determinative in a recoupment action. 141
134 See id. at 357.
1' See Westaff, 298 F.3d at 1166-67.136 See id. at 1166.
137 See id.
138 Id. (citing to Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1528 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
139 See id.
140 Id. at 1167.
141 See, e.g., Community Health Plan of Ohio, 347 F.3d 619; Professional Claims
Management v. Carver, 88 Fed.Appx. 872 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion).
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In QualChoice, Inc. v. Rowland, the Sixth Circuit established a new
interpretative view of Knudson by denying the plan equitable relief
under section 502(a)(3). 142 Following the Ninth Circuit's lead, it did so
on the grounds that the claim was based on a breach of the plan's
reimbursement provision, which was a "legal" claim not permitted
under ERISA's remedy provisions.
The facts of this case are roughly the same as those previously
discussed: a plan fiduciary sought recovery of benefits paid on the
behalf of a plan participant who later settled with a third party
tortfeasor. When the participant refused to reimburse the plan for
money advanced to pay medical costs, the fiduciary sought specific
performance of the reimbursement provision and equitable
restitution. 43 The plan offered evidence that the participant was in
possession of an identifiable fund and that fund belonged in good
conscience to the plan. 1
44
In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit-noting the circuit split and its
own previous holdings-found that a "procedural conundrum" existed
in so far as the plan was seeking monetary relief under restitution
(traditionally a claim at law) while also seeking equitable restitution in
the form of a constructive trust or equitable lien.145 The court held that
the plan's actions, based in contract, were legal and that while
monetary relief was sometimes available in equity, in this instance the
contractual obligation was the basis of the suit and terming the relief
sought as "equitable" did not change the nature of the action.
146
Equitable restitution was developed as means by which plaintiffs who
lacked formal title could bring an action in a court of equity. 147 Courts
of law were traditionally limited to entertaining only those claims
where formal title was in dispute. 148 Because the relief sought by
QualChoice was money "an intangible"), the problem of formal title in
the case was irrelevant.
4
142 QualChoice, 367 F.3d at 638.
143 See id. at 640-41. Initially, QualChoice, Inc. sought the remedy of restitution, but
later filed an amended complaint that specifically requested "equitable restitution,
imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien" in order to comply with section
502(a)(3). Id. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and QualChoice then appealed. Id.
144 See id. at 643.14 5 Id. at 649.
146 See QualChoice, 367 F.3d at 649.
147 Id.
14 8 
Id.
149 Id.
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QualChoice, Inc. aDpealed the decision to the Supreme Court
and certiorari was denied. f Until the Supreme Court gives a clearer
explanation, a question remains as to which analysis is right-or more
accurately-who is the most right. The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
all have indicated that Knudson did not provide the clearest of answers
to the question of whether the enforcement of reimbursement
provisions by fiduciaries against plan participants is permitted under
section 502(a)(3), and have largely differed on the scope and meaning
of the majority's holding.' 51
IV. DETERMINING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
RECOUPMENT PROVISIONS
A. Common Interpretive Factors
There are common factors within each method of analysis of a
recoupment provision fact pattern utilized by the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
circuits. Among these are the recognition of the coexistence of contract
and unjust enrichment claims, the presence of an identifiable fund, and
the underlying question of ERISA jurisdiction. The first two
commonalities are tied to the "equitable" question surrounding section
502(a)(3): whether the claim is one that falls squarely within the
purview of "appropriate equitable restitution." The jurisdictional factor
goes to the pragmatic issue of the availability of an adequate remedy,
either at law or in equity. Initially, when reviewing a case involving the
breach of a recoupment provision, a court must determine if the legal
remedy-i.e., the enforcement of the contractual obligation-is
available to the fiduciary.
Whether a claim is permitted by section 514 of ERISA as a state
law contract action requires an examination and interpretation of the
broad preemptive nature of ERISA over state law. 152 Within the
150 QualChoice, 367 F.3d at 638, cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1639 (2005).
'1 See, e.g., id. at 648 ("we believe that no clear or binding answer emerges to the
question before us"); Bauhaus, 292 F.3d at 445 (replying to the majority's "overly
expansive reading of [Knudson]" and having "difficulty in discerning the majority's
precise reading"); Westaff, 298 F.3d at 1166 ("the Supreme Court has recently
affirmed our approach in [Knudson]").
152 Section 514 preempts "all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan." Barber v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 383 F.3d
134, at 137 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "relate to" included state law claims
to enforce a contract. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (the "policy choices reflected
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specific context of Knudson-like claims, this availability or lack thereof
of a legal remedy in the form of a breach of contract state law claim
arguably influences the permissibility of equitable restitution in the
presence of the breach. If ERISA is found not to preclude a fiduciary
from suing the participant under state contract law, the fiduciary may
attempt to enforce the breach of contract claim in state court and seek
the traditional legal remedies available therein. 153
However, ERISA precludes state law in most instances where
the claim relates to the plan. Traditionally if a legal remedy is
precluded, a court may utilize its equity powers to award relief,
provided an equitable remedy is available. Congress-by denying legal
relief to fiduciaries under ERISA-alternatively provided an equitable
remedial provision in section 502(a)(3)(B). This would appear to favor
the granting of relief because Congress substituted equitable relief
when it removed legal remedies from the ERISA landscape.
Historically, the imposition of equitable relief by the judiciary was
strongly dependent upon how the claim was framed. As discussed
above, Knudson did not deny relief to Great-West on the basis of
ERISA preclusion-rather, Great-West failed to state an equitable
claim. Knudson appears to say that if a fiduciary requests equitable
relief, it must adhere strictly to the requirements of constructive trust or
equitable lien.
This leads us to the equitable issues of the coexistence of
contract and unjust enrichment claims and the presence of an
identifiable fund. As stated above, in a suit by a fiduciary to recoup
money owed to it by a participant, section 502(a)(3) is the exclusive
enforcement provision available under ERISA and permits a court to
in the inclusion of [ERISA's civil enforcement scheme and remedies] and the
exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if
[participants and beneficiaries] were free to obtain remedies under state law that
Congress rejected in ERISA.") However, it's unclear if this rule can be expanded to
actions initiated by fiduciaries to enforce provisions contained within an ERISA-
govemed plan. See McDowell, 385 F.3d at 1172-73..
153 As stated previously, remedies available for breach of contract claims were
predominantly awarded in courts of law. During oral argument, the Knudson-court
expressed concern that ERISA, a law written to "protect the assets of workers in
plans," would preempt a Plan's actions to recover a contract claim in state court while
simultaneously denying legal relief-which recoveries of contract claims are
considered. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. v. Knudson, No. 99-1786, 2001 U.S.
Trans Lexis 50, at *30 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2001). This would seemingly leave one to think
that the Court would allow an equitable remedy in the form of money on a
recoupment provision claim because it's likely "Congress wants the plan to be able to
get its money back." Id. at 30-31.
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award "other appropriate equitable relief." As previously discussed, in
determining if the remedy sought by a fiduciary is "equitable," the
appellate courts have adopted two different analyses. The Sixth and
Ninth Circuits have looked to the nature of the claim as
determinative-a "procedural"-like analysis that ignores the remedy
requested. The Fifth Circuit's analysis is based on assessing the nature
of the remedy sought-a "substantive" examination of what a plan is
asking of the court.
In determining the nature of the claim, a court looks to whether
the claim sounds in law or equity. This is dependent upon variables
such as the presence of a contract, the cause of action stated in the
claim, and-as the majority stated in Knudson-the legal theory upon
which the claim is offered. For example, in instances of breach of
contract a court may give great weight to the presence of the contract as
the basis of the complaint, regardless if unjust enrichment is claimed as
the substantive basis of liability. In doing so, the claim is characterized
as legal. Alternatively, a court may recognize and honor the
coexistence of an equitable claim (e.g., unjust enrichment) in the
presence of a breach of contract, and may deem it equitable.
By looking at the nature of the remedy requested, a court asks if
the claimant is seeking legal or equitable relief. This can be answered
by determining whether the remedy imposes an in rem or in personam
obligation upon the party against whom the claim is made. For a
claimant seeking in rem relief-an equitable remedy-this requires the
presence of an identifiable fund which in good conscience belongs to
the claimant. All other claims which fail to adhere to these
requirements are deemed as in personam, and are characterized as
legal. Legal claims are not permitted under section 502(a)(3).
B. Looking to the Nature of the Claim: Analysis of the Sixth
and Ninth Circuit Decisions Demonstrates They Are Not in
Line With Knudson
The Ninth Circuit's position is not in line with the Supreme Court's
holding in Knudson. The rationale of Westaff, Inc., in which the court
looked to the nature of the claim, was taken from the Supreme Court's
decision in Mertens.154 In Mertens, an express reimbursement
obligation between the parties was absent-there was no unjust
154 See Westaff, 298 F.3d at 1166.
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enrichment 155-and to apply a similar analysis to Westaff appears
simplistic. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's rationale seems at odds
with Justice Scalia's statement in Knudson that "[i]t is doubtful ... that
'restitution' ... pertains to the substance of the relief rather than to the
legal theory under which it is awarded." 156 Under the Ninth Circuit's
analysis invariably all claims that seek monetary relief in the presence
of a contractual obligation will be deemed legal, a point that the
majority did not expressly make in Knudson. Rather, Knudson
emphasized that a plaintiff could seek legal or equitable restitution for
money, but it could only chose equitable restitution as a theory of
recovery if the money or property belonged in good conscience to the
plaintiff and the plaintiff could clearly trace and identify the funds or
property in the defendant's possession. 
57
The Sixth Circuit's decision accords with the Ninth Circuit's
determination that the nature of a subrogation claim is legal. Its
decision in QualChoice, however, turned on the historical distinctions
of breach of contract claims in courts of law and equity, rather than on
the "substance" of the remedy. 58 It concluded that the monetary relief
Qualchoice, Inc. sought did not invoke the difficulties of formal title
and that the action was analogous to an action for assumpsit, a concept
that was created and handled predominantly by courts of law. 159 In
support, the Sixth Circuit stated that the reimbursement clause in the
benefits agreement required the participant to repay the plan for his
covered medical expenses, but it did not give the Plan "a property right
in any particular fund."' 160 The nature of the claim did not sound in
rem-based equitable remedies such as a constructive trust.
In summary, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits look to the nature of
the claim as the determinative factor as to what constitutes "equitable"
restitution. They appear to say that if the plaintiffs claim under section
502(a)(3) can be characterized as legal, then section 502(a)(3) does not
provide a remedy even if the plaintiff could also (1) plead an equitable
155 The dispute in Mertens centered around whether plan participants could sue the
plan's actuary, a nonfiduciary, under section 502(a)(3) for monetary relief due to the
actuary's failure to adequately monitor the Plan's funds. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at
251. The participants were not refusing to repay the plan, thereby becoming unjustly
enriched, unlike the tortfeasors in Knudson and Qualchoice. See id.
156 Knudson, 534 U.S. at 216 (emphasis in original).
... See id. at 213.
158 See QualChoice, 367 F.3d at 649.
159 See id. The Sixth Circuit's definition of assumpsit and its historical development in
legal restitution is accurate. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 571-72.
160 See Qualchoice, 367 F. 3d at 649.
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claim such as unjust enrichment and (2) identify specific assets that in
good conscience belong to the plaintiff. Under this rule, the remedy
requested appears to be irrelevant: it does not matter whether a plaintiff
can identify specific assets that in good conscience belong to the
plaintiff or whether the plaintiff could have enforced the recoupment
provision under state law. Recoupment provisions just appear to be
unenforceable.
The difficulty in accepting this analysis lies in the
mischaracterization of the determinants of equity and legal restitution.
While monetary relief was primarily awarded in courts of law, the
Sixth Circuit failed to appreciate that it could also be obtained in a
court of equity.' 61 It also did not recognize the possibility of a
coexistence of parallel theories of liability under restitution and
contract, a concept that Justices Scalia and Ginsburg did not mention in
Knudson but implicitly affirmed by not simply ruling that Great-West
had an available remedy at law in its breach of contract claim but was
statutorily preempted by ERISA from recovering non-equitable
relief. 1
62
Furthermore, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits did not adequately
confront the consequences of denying relief to a plan based on
preclusion of legal relief by statute. This would in effect render a plan
seeking to enforce recoupment provisions without an adequate remedy
at law. Traditionally, this legislatively-driven preclusion would enable
a court to use its equity powers to determine if relief should be
awarded. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits' analyses, however, never reach
this depth, as the courts appear to be content to prohibit the application
of recoupment provisions to plan participants.
Finally, perhaps the most problematic area of the Sixth Circuit's
decision was its conclusion that enforcement of a recoupment provision
is always a legal action and a fiduciary is thereby precluded from suing
the plan participant under section 502(a)(3). 161 It based this conclusion
on the argument that monetary relief sought in a breach of contract
claim was legal because it was historically awarded in courts of law,
161 See supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text (discussing monetary relief in
courts of law and equity). Professor Langbein spoke of the Supreme Court's failure to
understand that money damages are not exclusively a realm of courts of law. In fact, a
court in equity often gave monetary relief, depending upon several factors. See
Langbein, supra note 11, at 1350-52.
162 See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (providing a parallel theories of
recovery under contract and unjust enrichment).
163 See QualChoice, 367 F.3d at 650.
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regardless of the possession of an identifiable fund. 164 Determining that
in the presence of a breach of contract claim all relief sought by a plan
is thereby legal, the court may have significantly lessened the power of
section 502(a)(3) because it implicitly sends the message that all
monetary relief based on a breach of contract claim sought under
502(a)(3) is precluded. For example, a broad reading of QualChoice
would preclude a claim seeking reimbursement of an overpayment to a
plan participant. 165
If this broad reading is accurate, then the Sixth Circuit's
holding is at odds with Varity, where the Supreme Court stated that
502(a)(3) was created as a "catchall" provision that offers "appropriate
equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that section 502 does
not elsewhere remedy., 166  By permitting relief under section
502(a)(3)(B) for breach of fiduciary duty, the Varity Court was acting
in a consistent manner with ERISA's purposes and textual language.' 6
A plan participant harmed by Varity Corporation's misrepresentation-
a violation of the duty of good faith espoused in trust law-was found
to be able to seek equitable relief.16 8 But if the Sixth Circuit's
conclusion in QualChoice is correct, a broad reading seems to say that
monetary relief sought under section 502(a)(3) is essentially legal relief
164 See id. at 649.
165 Roger Siske described how the Seventh Circuit has precluded relief in this issue
because it is a "legal" claim for a return of money, but also stated that two other
district courts found the Plan was entitled to recover the overpayment. See Siske,
supra note 12, at 283-85 (citing Leipzig v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 362 F.3d 406 (7th Cir.
2004); Fick v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2004);
North American Coal Corp. Retirement Savings Plan v. Roth, 2004 WL 434150 (D.
N.D. Mar. 5, 2004)). District courts in the Eleventh Circuit have ruled separately on
both the recovery of an overpayment by a fund and the subrogation claims regarding
recovery of medical benefits, and appeared to have adopted the analysis of the Fifth
Circuit. Consistent and logical rulings resulted. See, e.g., Onofrieti v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (overpayment of funds); B.P. Amoco
Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (subrogation claims).
166 Varity, 516 U.S. at 512.
167 See id. at 497, 515 ("we believe that granting a remedy is consistent with the literal
language of the statute, the Act's purpose, and pre-existing trust law."); Varity Report,
supra note 49, at 14 (discussing Justice Breyer's use of legislative history and notions
of trust law in interpreting section 502(a)(3) of ERISA).
168 See Varity, 516 U.S. at 515 (finding that section 502(a)(3) permits "individualized
equitable relief'). The majority in Varity stated that since the plaintiffs could not seek
relief under sections 502(a)(1)(B) or 502(a)(2), they needed to "rely on [section
502(a)(3)] or ... have no remedy at all." Id. This seems to accord with permitting a
court to use its equity powers when other forms of relief are precluded or there is no
adequate remedy at law.
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and is not permitted. This reading may extend to prohibiting monetary
relief in a breach of fiduciary duty, thereby weakening the underlying
principles upon which Varity's holding was placed. 169 This is not what
the Supreme Court appeared to say in Knudson.
Justice Scalia, in denying monetary relief to Great-West,
aligned Varity with the majority's decision by stating that it was
"undisputed that the respondents [in Varity] were seeking equitable
relief."' 170 Scalia's strong emphasis upon the lack of identifiable funds
possessed by the Knudsons and the request by Great-West for "some
funds" were the lynchpins in his argument that the relief sought was
legal and thus not within the limits of "other appropriate equitable
relief."171 This importance of identifiable funds suggests that equitable
relief could be attained in a claim of unjust enrichment with the
presence of a breach of contract. It also recognizes the parallel basis of
liability of unjust enrichment and breach of contract, and allows a court
to use its equity powers when there is no adequate remedy at law due to
statutory preclusion.
Justice Scalia's remarks that the majority's holding in Knudson
was not in conflict with Varity offers further weight to the argument
that the determination of restitution lies in the type of relief requested,
whether it be legal in the form of assumpsit or equitable in the form of
a constructive trust. Under a broad reading of the Sixth Circuit's
conclusion, all relief based on a contractual provision which sought
monetary funds would likely be precluded in an action by a plan
fiduciary to enforce a reimbursement provision. 172
169 See id. The confusion in the wake of Knudson has also caused recent inconsistent
decisions in cases involving misrepresentation by fiduciaries, similar to that in Varity.
See Siske, supra note 12, at 291-93 (comparing Schaeffer v. Albert Einstein Health
Care Network, 2004 WL 1012574 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2004) (holding that a claim
seeking relief for fiduciary misrepresentation cognizable under section 502(a)(3)),
with Ramsey v. Formica Corp., 2004 WL 1146334 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2004) (denying
injunctive relief for fiduciary misrepresentation under section 502(a)(3) because the
claim was really for money damages)). The Second Circuit, following Knudson,
reversed its previous determination that breach of fiduciary duty claims were
equitable. Gerosa v. Savasta & Co., Inc., 329 F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 2003).
170 Knudson, 534 U.S. at 221.
171 See id. at 212-15.
172 There is a possibility the Sixth Circuit's holding may be in line with Knudson if it
can be demonstrated that the determinative factor of a legal/equitable claim has room
to permit a "breach of fiduciary duty" claim. The argument could go something like
this: the court does not recognize the coexisting breach of contract claim, but the
participant could sue under state tort law. Due to the pre-emption of the state law
claim, any remaining remedy under section 502(a)(3) is available only if the
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C. The Fifth Circuit is Aligned Most Closely With Knudson
by Looking to the Nature of the Relief Requested
The Fifth Circuit's analysis and interpretation of Knudson in
Bombardier appear to be the most likely reading and subsequent
application of the case.1 73 The Knudson majority emphasized that for
an action to lie in equity the Knudsons would have had to have
possession of the funds, and the funds would have to be traceable to an
account controlled by the Knudsons. 174 This would have avoided the in
personam action Great-West was seeking by asking the Court for
enforcement of the contract through the securing of a constructive trust
or equitable lien. By failing to specify the property it alleged belonged
to it, Great-West was in actuality seeking the imposition of personal
liability for the repayment of its money. This relief was not permitted
under the Court's reading of section 502(a)(3). 175
Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit had previously ruled on a case
involving a subrogation and reimbursement claim similar to that in
Knudson. In Bauhaus U.S.A., Inc. v. Copeland, the Fifth Circuit held
that due to the "nearly identical" factual situation to Knudson, the court
lacked federal jurisdiction over the matter because the funds the plan
sought were not in the possession of the plan participants.1 76 This
holding evoked a rigorous dissent by Judge Wiener, who labeled the
ruling overbroad and stated it lacked the appreciation of the distinctions
between equitable and legal relief.'7 7 In support, he pointed to the
participant strictly seeks equitable relief in its claim. The Sixth Circuit has not yet
been confronted with this scenario, however, and it is unknown if the court interprets
section 502(a)(3) as providing recourse for claims involving the recovery of an
overpayment of plan funds.
173 See Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 348.
174 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 214 ("the funds ... are not in the respondent's
possession").
175 Id. at 214.
176 See Bauhaus, 292 F.3d at 443. The funds were not in the possession of the
Copelands, but rather were held in the registry of the Mississippi Chancery Court. Id.
at 445. Bauhaus was seeking a declaratory judgment in order to proceed with a
subrogation action to take control of the funds. Id. at 440.
177 See id. He stated that the majority "implicitly assume[d]" that the court was to
"take Bauhaus's prayer for relief at face value, even though the [Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] mandate that in awarding relief, federal courts [should] look beyond
the prayer to the underlying claim." Id. at 448. Wiener asserted that the majority's
decision lacked the spirit needed to try and make sense of the Supreme Court's
holding in Knudson, and stated that the Court determined that the particular posture of
that case did not permit the granting of equitable relief. Id. at 449. Also, Knudson
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equitable nature of declaratory judgment and subrogation actions.
Wiener argued that the enforcement of these actions would not create a
personal and general money obligation for the plan participants but
alternatively enforce an in rem action against a fund held by a neutral
party. 178 Undoubtedly, this was the implication of Knudson.
Judge Wiener revisited this issue one year later in Bombardier,
where in writing for the majority he formulated the three-step test based
upon the rationale utilized by the Supreme Court in Knudson. 79 The
first and second factors of the test speak to the nature of the
constructive trust and equitable lien, as described by Justice Scalia in
Knudson. The third factor of the test distinguished the facts of Bauhaus
from Bombardier because the defendant in Bauhaus was not in control
of the funds, 180 and would allow a court to grant a plan fiduciary,
participant, or beneficiary monetary relief under section 502(a)(3) of
ERISA.
Looking closely at the test in Bombardier, the Fifth Circuit
appears to say that even if the plaintiffs claim can be characterized as
legal, as long as the plaintiff can plead an equitable claim (e.g., unjust
enrichment) and identify specific assets that in good conscience belong
to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff will be allowed to recover under
section 502(a)(3). Under this rule, the nature of the claim-i.e., based
on contract-and availability of a legal remedy appear to be irrelevant.
That is, it does not matter whether the plaintiff has a legal claim that is
enforceable under state law. As long as the plaintiff can plead an
equitable claim and identify specific assets that in good conscience
belong to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff will be allowed to recover
under section 502(a)(3).
This three-step approach is not without potential problems. A
court must be cautious in not overextending the application of Knudson
to dissimilar factual patterns, and must be wary in identifying the
explicitly stated that it left several significant issues unanswered. This implicitly
called for a careful, narrow reading of Knudson. See id. at 448-50.
178 See Siske, supra note 12, at 273-74. Judge Wiener makes it clear that Bauhaus was
not seeking recovery from the defendant's personal monetary account or personal
assets, but rather money that was distinct from the defendant resources. See Bauhaus,
292 F.3d at 450.
179 See Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356.
180 Possession and control is not limited to the defendant's exclusive possession. See
Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356. A court may also find that the defendant has agency
control over funds. Id. at 357 (stating that the court was "unpersuaded by the
contention ... that [the defendant] lacks 'possession and control' over" the defendant
attorney's trust account).
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underlying relief sought by the plan fiduciary as in rem, and not in
personam. However, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Bombardier allows
a plan fiduciary to pursue the equitable remedy of restitution by
following the Supreme Court's conditions that give rise to equitable
relief under section 502(a)(3), and most importantly stays within the
most likely scope of the holding of Knudson, avoiding the over
expansive reading the Fifth Circuit had previously held in Bauhaus.
D. Enforcing Recoupment Provisions Under State Law
Lastly, it is important for a reviewing court to note that the Supreme
Court did leave open another possibility for the enforcement of
recoupment provisions: Claims may be executed under state law. Yet it
is unclear if a breach of contract claim enforced under state law would
be preempted under ERISA, as the Court has never stated that it would
or would not be. Assuming that preemption did not occur, if a
plaintiffs claim can be characterized as legal (e.g., breach of contract
claim) and a legal remedy is available (e.g., the plaintiff can sue under
state contract law), then section 502(a)(3) does not provide relief even
if the plaintiff can plead an equitable claim and identify specific assets
that in good conscience belong to the plaintiff. In a case such as this,
the nature of the remedy requested and thus the applicability of the
Fifth Circuit's test would appear to be irrelevant. The reason a
plaintiff's claim would fail is an adequate remedy at law exists via state
court; thus no equitable remedy is necessary.
CONCLUSION
In its next term, the Supreme Court will revisit the question of whether
reimbursement provisions may be enforced under ERISA section
502(a)(3) in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services.181 The Court
will hopefully end the increasingly fractured stance assumed by the
appellate courts and the confusion surrounding the scope and meaning
of Knudson.182 Pending a clear directive from the Court, a reviewing
181 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical
Services, a Fourth Circuit case that upheld the subrogation rights of the insurer.
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, 407 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 8573 (Nov. 28, 2005). The Fourth Circuit has adopted the
"Three-step test" analysis of the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 218-19.
182 The grant of certiorari in Sereboff has been long-awaited. As previously stated, the
respondents in the Sixth Circuit's decision in QualChoice, Inc. v. Rowland appealed
their case to the Supreme Court and certiorari was denied. See QualChoice, 367 F.3d
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court must take a plenary analysis of the implications of the holdings of
Russell-Mertens-Varity-Knudson and the meaning of equitable
restitution. Likely, the Supreme Court will affirm its holding in
Knudson but assert that it is a narrow ruling which permits a court to
afford "equitable relief' to a plan seeking to enforce a reimbursement
provision. This would be a logical conclusion, because by Congress
limiting relief to only that which is equitable, the Court would likely be
permitted to substitute equitable remedies in breach of contract
claims-provided the claims are framed as sounding in equity and there
is no adequate remedy at law. Such a ruling will lend support to the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Knudson, and will permit benefit plans
to recover money paid out as benefits from those participants who
recover from third party tortfeasors.
In addition, the Court will likely have to further distinguish its
seemingly expansive reading of section 502(a)(3) in Varity, which
termed the provision as a "catchall" remedy in a case of breach of
fiduciary duty, from the narrower, rigid-like conditions set forth in
Knudson, and may opt to point out that when finding fiduciary wrongs
in the absence of a breach of contract claim, a court may use its equity
powers in a more flexible manner based on historical notions of trust
law. Nonetheless, should the Court elect to uphold the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of Knudson and thereby explicitly permit plan fiduciaries
such as insurers to recover from injured plan participants, the social
cost of that potential ruling may be seen as slanting the playing field
towards insurers due to the Court's recent decision in Aetna Health v.
Davila. '83 With the legislative movement to protect patients' rights in
wrongful benefit denials by amending ERISA's remedial provisions
638 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1639 (2005). They were not alone: recent
decisions by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits were also denied certiorari. See Crosby v.
Bowater Inc. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of Greater Northern Paper Inc.,
382 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1844 (stating that in the past
year alone five other circuits, in addition to the Sixth, have struggled with the
meaning of Knudson); McDowell v. Providence Health Care Plan, 385 F.3d 1168 (9th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1726 (2005) (holding that all relief sought that is
based on contractual obligations are ordinary damages, and not permitted under
section 502(a)(3)).
183 The Supreme Court ruled in June 2004 that participants of health care plans who
have been injured as a result of a benefit determination made by a plan are entitled
only to recover the cost of the benefit denied, and not any compensation for resulting
injury. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004). The ruling in effect
overturned state laws designed to protect patients by allowing recovery for money
damages, and has been criticized as further insulating health benefit plans from any
accountability for wrongful benefit denials in their mission to contain costs. See id.
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beyond glacial, such a ruling may refocus reform efforts on Capitol
Hill. This remains to be seen.
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